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GLOBALISATION, ELECTRONIC EMPIRE, AND THE VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHY OF
KOREA’S INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE *
BY

KWANG-SUK LEE

Abstract / The present study focuses on the electronic infrastructural condition for current global
capitalism. This study briefly surveys the genealogy of globalisation theories, focusing especially
on Marxist interpretations of capital accumulation on a global scale. The study situates the
historical–geographical condition of Korea’s informatisation in relation to the new world system
which Hardt and Negri have described as ‘Empire’, the replacement for classical imperialism.
Based on this concept of ‘Empire’, the paper explores how Korea has been rapidly and
successfully incorporated into the imperial network by mobilizing her citizens towards highspeed telecom mobility and connexity across the country. It concludes, however, that behind
Korea’s public image as a global IT leader, the other, darker side of Korea’s informatisation is
composed of the complex and intricate traits of the local, exhibited under extreme state
interventionism and uneven geographies of centrality and marginality.
This study focuses on the new material conditions of globalisation, which is virtually constructed
by the worldwide electronic network of capital1. The virtual geography of globalisation based on
mobility and connexity signifies a power shift of capital, and forces local states to affiliate as or
integrate into a part of the new world system which Hardt and Negri have described as ‘Empire’,
the replacement for classical imperialism. The survival of local regions depends largely on their
close links to the global electronic conduits of capital. Under the new conditions of virtual
geographies, inequalities of development and underdevelopment are complicated by whether an
entity is ‘plugged’ or ‘unplugged’ into the worldwide electronic web of Empire. The present
study investigates the new global order of electronic Empire by tracking back the development of
Marxist globalisation theories — a series of critical theories extending from classical imperialism
to the current discussion of Empire via the dependency theories in Latin America, the world
system theory, the cultural complexity theory, and the global-local nexus theory. This study
further situates Korea’s information and technology (IT) growth within the universal structure of
electronic Empire, and reveals it as a desperate striving to enlist the local as an active part of the
new global network. Through exploring the historical-geographical development of information
and communication infrastructure in Korea, this study views the complex and hybrid
mechanisms of pervasive state interventionism both for regulatory control and due to economic
imperatives, and concludes that these specific mechanisms of local states must be understood
*
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within the holistic perspective of electronic Empire as immanent and ubiquitous power.
This study excludes from its analysis the momentum of resistance which could challenge
contemporary global power. Rather than exploring the necessary form of counter-insurgencies
opposed to this power, the present study aims to elaborate the structural metamorphosis of
capitalism from the old system of imperialism to the dispersal of power throughout the world
market under the new system of Empire.
Looking Back to the Age of Imperialism
Fukuyama (1992) admires globalisation as the triumph of capitalism and its market economy,
and Friedman (1999, 2006) welcomes a ‘flattening’ and fibre-optic global world with unbounded
enthusiasm. Even if we ignore these popular triumphalists who defend a globalising world as
united, it is a harsh reality that the economic logic of contemporary capitalism penetrates every
corner of human life across the globe. Already in the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx
predicted a global move toward unconstrained capitalist expansion:
All that is solid melts into air [...]. The need of a constantly expanding market for its
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. [...] In one word, it
creates a world after its own image. (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1998: 38–40)
Historically, Marxist critics have defined globalisation as the developed countries and
multinationals’ imperialist expansion ‘without colonies’ (Magdoff, 2003) through absorbing
surplus from the so-called ‘third world’ and thus undermining its technological, political,
economic, cultural conditions. Confronting the age of imperialism in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, a revolutionary Marxist like Lenin ([1916] 1969) sees the colonialist
mechanism of dominance in terms of the rise of monopoly and the export of capital abroad.
Luxemburg ([1913] 2003) posits the birth of imperialism in the capitalist need for surplus outlets
in non-capitalist formations; Baran ([1957] 1968) sees imperialism as arising from an American
capitalism dominated by monopolies; since these are incompatible with growth and
technological innovation, he thinks that the only way to escape the monopolistic state of
stagnation is by exporting capital, which helps to absorb surplus from underdeveloped countries
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like those in Latin America. Though these classical Marxists rarely considered the complex and
subtle logic of political, economic, and cultural dominance on a global scale, they contributed to
developing the common idea that capitalism always needs to prolong the lifespan of monopolies
at the cost of non-capitalist or underdeveloped countries.
From the late 1960s to the late 1970s there was another theoretical trend in explaining
globalisation: the ‘dependency theories’. Andre Frank (1969) sees ‘underdevelopment’ in Latin
America as largely controlled by US monopolies. Frank thus views the capitalist system as
divided into a centre and a periphery. Frank attempts to explain a continued failure of
‘development’ in Latin America, even in the era of decolonization. Similarly, Amin (1974)
describes a chain of ‘metropolis–satellite’ or centre–periphery structures using the concept of
‘accumulation on a world scale’. Wallerstein (1979) extends Amin’s dual system to the
hierarchical division of the capitalist ‘world system’ as a totality divided into three tiers of states,
those at the core, at the semi-periphery, and at the periphery. Related to the economic status of
the peripheral countries, Cardoso’s (1973) ‘associated dependent development’ and Evans’
(1979) ‘dependent development’ are further examinations of the limited scope of development in
the Third World which suggest that ‘partial’ development or growth can be accomplished under
the general conditions of dependency. These dependency theories are devoted to explaining a
value chain of accumulation on a global scale, unequal development among states, and the
destructive effects of multinational capital to the Third World; they failed, however, to anticipate
the East Asian form of state-interventionist ‘development’, in which states become relatively free
of the structural constraints of dependency.
Since the 1980s, facing the ‘new’ phase of capitalism mediated by the microelectronic
revolution, critical media scholars have begun to analyse international flows of information,
communication, and culture as much as those of industrial and financial capital: such political
economists as Herbert Schiller (1981, 1984) and Hamelink (1984) began to examine the
integrated role of information and communication for the general operation of global monopolies
as the ‘trans-border data flow’. Examining the international traffic of media contents such as film
and TV programmes, Guback (1984) presents an analysis of the film business with the state as its
active supporter in the national and international arena. Employing the classical view of
imperialism, Varis (1984) regards the dominant flows of the US television programs as being
similar to the export of commodities in general, rather than as ‘cultural’ output which should be
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‘interpreted’ and ‘decoded’ by the audience. A significant theme in research on the international
political economy is how the global activities of transnational media and telecommunication
industries are freer from the regulatory barriers of other countries than those of industries in the
classical sense. This theme has led to such critical topics as following: the monopolistic global
media system and the cross-border flows of media outputs (e.g. Herman and McChesney, 1997);
the homogenising effects of media contents on indigenous cultures (e.g. Tomlinson’s [1991]
discussion of ‘cultural imperialism’ in the critique of global capitalism); and the reorganization
of global electronic communications on behalf of capital’s demands (e.g. Castells, 1996; Golding,
1996; Mosco, 1996; Schiller, 1999, 2001).
These Marxist scholars’ studies of imperialism enable us to see how media monopolies
reconfigure the new order of capitalism and reproduce the unequal relations between states.
Their perspective, however, is based on a rather simple dichotomy of dominance and
subordination in the global economy, which fails to take into consideration the complex and
heterogeneous flows of technology, information, culture, and people cross the border.
Whose Hybridity or Complexity?
Critiques of Marxist economic reductionism, which had a tendency to focus on a shift towards a
single united world economy, have arisen first from the problematic that globalisation can no
longer be understood by simple centre–periphery models or as a single one world-system. One
kind of critique arises from a ‘loose’ structure thesis, which emphasizes the relative
independence of ‘socio-cultural’ factors in the local when subjected to the globalising force (e.g.
Robertson, 1990). It is based on the theoretical presumption that there are fundamental
‘disjunctures’ between economy, culture, and politics; Appadurai (1990) argues that we need to
differentiate the manifold spheres of international interaction in terms of ‘ethnoscapes’
(descriptions of the flows of peoples), ‘technoscapes’ (of technology), ‘finanscapes’ (of money),
‘mediascapes’ (of media contents), and ‘ideoscapes’ (of ideologies). Sreberny (2005) extends the
analysis of globalisation to the multi-dimensional spheres of global culture, including mapmaking and nation-building, the export of religion, the institutionalization of Western-style
education, administration as a ‘professional imperialism’, colonial languages, the ‘pleasure
periphery’ produced to serve travel and tourism, and the transfer of technology.
These analytical divisions of ‘globalisation’ into multi-layered mini-globalising processes
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have resulted in an awareness of the ‘non-linear, fractured nature of cultural globalization’ (Ang,
1996: 154) — the so-called ‘hybridity’ of global culture — in contrast to the replication of
uniformity by economic globalisation: some empirical studies, for instance, focus on the
independent consumption patterns of TV audiences, which are greatly affected by the ‘cultural
proximity’ created by such factors as local culture, language difference, and local market
strength, and other cultural variables (Straubhaar, 1991). These studies were largely based on the
successful story of multinational channels such as Televisa (Mexico) and TV Globo (Brazil) in
Latin America as a counter to worldwide cultural standardization by global media outputs
(Sinclair, 1999)2. Defenders of cultural localism note the ‘loose’ relation between structure as a
globalizing power and the local as relative autonomy — a dialectical relation that is conditioned
by the ‘slightly higher’ weight of the former on the latter (Straubhaar, 1998: 6).
The research on particularity in Latin America in terms of cultural proximity once again
reveals globalisation as a web of ‘hybridity’, ‘complexity’, or ‘mélange’ (Pieterse, [1995] 2005;
García Canclini, 1997; Straubhaar and Hammond, 1998). These new approaches view uneven,
asymmetric, and even ‘unpredictable’ links in the global–local nexus as salient in the present
phase of globalisation. They aim to negate the dualistic and hierarchical framing of the world in
terms of dominant and dominated, coloniser and colonised, and centre and periphery, to
engender more fertile possibilities that allow us to see globalisation ‘from below’ (the local),
specifically, to ground critical globalisation studies in praxis (e.g. Kellner, 2002; Robinson,
2005). Globalisation as complex and hybrid enables us to see many deviations from a rigidly
‘prefigured’ path of a globalizing force into one world-system (Straubhaar and Hammond, 1998),
and to perceive socio-cultural complexities as supporting cultural sustainability and participatory
democracy in the local or the periphery.
In contrast, rather than seeing the politics of ‘hope’ or the ‘Third Way’ in global
complexity, some scholars approach complexity as the art of legitimating the scope of global
capitalism. For instance, Urry (2005) divides the global system into two main forms, ‘global
networks’ and ‘global fluids’ (245–249): while global networks are predictable, calculable,
routinised, integrated, and standardised (as in global enterprises), global fluids are autopoietic,
rhizomatic, and decentralised (as in world money, automobility, social movements, the Internet,
the anti-globalisation movement, international terrorism, and so forth); it is the latter that
accounts for the aspects of global complexity and hybridity. It is significant that Urry describes

Globalisation, E-empire & the Virtual Geography of Korea’s Telecom Infrastructure

6

globalisation as ‘pools of order that heighten overall disorder’ (249). His viewpoint is analogous
to Hall’s (1991) perspective on global economic and cultural power, which is always ‘wanting to
recognise and absorb [cultural] differences within the larger, overarching framework’ (28). Hall
argues that global power never attempts to obliterate differences or complexities: ‘it operates
through them, it has to hold the whole framework of globalization in place and simultaneously
police that system: it stage-manages independence within it […], without absolutely destroying
what is specific and particular’ (28–29). Hall describes the ‘de-centred’ power of globalisation as
absorbing the differences of the local; similarly, Urry describes it as ‘mobile power’ (249): it is
based on ‘speed, lightness, distance, weightlessness’, crossing over both global networks and
global fluids. In fact, mobile power achieves new and intricate relations between global networks
(the universalising power) and global fluids (the complex localities). Globalisation thus is ‘like
putting together a jigsaw puzzle: it is a matter of inserting a multiplicity of localities into the
overall picture of a new global system […]. The “local” should be seen as a fluid and relational
space, constituted only in and through its relation to the global’ (Morley and Robins, 1995: 116–
117).
These new approaches to the new intertwined dynamics of the global–local nexus revive
the more holistic and pessimistic vision of a ‘global state’ or ‘market state’ that ‘modulates’ the
local differences over its global network system, a system of ‘Empire’. The present study
examines the structure of Empire, in order to situate the historical–geographical condition of
Korea’s informatisation in relation to Empire’s global networks.
Modulating Local Differences ‘Smoothly’
Before directly examining Hardt and Negri’s (2000) description of Empire, it will be useful to
discuss the art of control in modern society. In his ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, Deleuze
([1990] 1995) develops Foucault’s ([1975] 1995) concept of ‘disciplines’ with the concept of
‘controls’. According to Deleuze, the ‘disciplinary societies’ that Foucault observed arising in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should be differentiated from the devices or techniques of
power arising in the twentieth century. Deleuze ([1990] 1995) describes current societies as
‘control societies’, and sees disciplinary societies as being superseded by control societies.
Deleuze’s division of societies into these two periods — that of discipline and that of control —
seems to be directly influenced by the potentials of digital information in modern society and its

Globalisation, E-empire & the Virtual Geography of Korea’s Telecom Infrastructure

7

application to the reproduction of power systems. He regards control societies as based on digital
technology, while disciplinary societies are based on analogue technology. Digital technology
facilitates free-floating control and modulates continuous flows of databases without spatialtemporal restraints, while analogue is the logic of ‘confinement’ and ‘mouldings’ that divide
units up into physical cells and moulds such as factories or prisons. Under digital conditions of
control, Deleuze opines that the masses become floating samples and data. In this respect, digital
technology becomes a new means for modern power to escape the confinement of fences,
barriers, and borders into the free-floating control of flow, speed, and mobility. In relation to the
current phase of globalisation, this Deleuzian concept gives us hints about how a global power
could have transformed from a centre–periphery system (the logic of analogue) to a complex and
dispersed system of global–local nexus (the logic of digital), and how worldwide capitalist power
integrates local differences within a globalising force by means of the control of digital
technology and its electronic networks.
The ‘Smooth World’ of Electronic Empire
Hardt and Negri apply Deleuze’s concept of power and ‘control societies’ to a ‘global society of
control’ crossing over national boundaries. According to them, we have entered into the new age
of ‘Empire’ in which ‘rule has no limits’ and ‘encompasses the spatial totality’ of the globe
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiv). The establishment of a global society of control ‘goes hand in hand
with the realization of the world market and the real subsumption of global society under capital’
(332). In the immanent and ubiquitous condition of global control by capital, it is meaningless to
demarcate geographical zones as centre and periphery, North and South, First World and Third
World: ‘The geography of uneven development and the lines of division and hierarchy will no
longer be found along stable national or international boundaries, but in fluid infra- and
supranational borders’ (335). This vision of a hybrid totality goes beyond the above-mentioned
multi-layered global–local nexus thesis, and argues for a global web structure of control by
capital over the ‘space of flows’. Under the condition of control, the sovereignty of nation-states
has declined, and the network of Empire becomes a description of the physical conduit for
contemporary global power. Fundamental sources of modern capitalist power are dependent
upon both connexity and mobility. Virilio (1997: 119–145) also describes how the incessant
desire of modern capitalism has been promoted by ‘speed’ and ‘mobility’. Enabled by the speed
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of electronic networks, the effect of ‘temporal-spatial compression’ (Harvey, 1989: 121–200)
facilitates the production and exchange of immaterial products such as financial capital,
electronic business data, and entertainment content. The global conduit of electronic
communications becomes the material infrastructure of contemporary global capitalism, also
allowing immaterial labour products to be disseminated throughout the entire world.
The present study is interested in the electronic infrastructural condition for current
global capitalism, and follows such descriptions as the ‘electronic global Empire’ or ‘e-Empire’
(Raley, 2004) or the ‘information Empire’ (Poster, 2004). These terms are used to designate a
new global power which has modulated its worldwide control through media and electronic
networks. The complex pyramid of global power has been built on ‘access to the means of
transportation and the resulting freedom of movement’ (Bauman, 2000: 10). The principal
strategy in the exercise of power has become extraterritorial and unbounded. The rejection of any
territorial confinement means that for the use of power, it rarely matters now ‘where the giver of
the command is’ (11), since power has become dispersive, de-centred, and even hybridised —
what Hardt and Negri call the ‘smooth world’ of Empire. From these ubiquitous traits of the
power of capital, we need to observe the virtual geographies of how the invisible web of global
fluids enables the concrete redefining of the new global system.
Modulation and Assemblage of Differences
Wide modulation of scope in power is impossible without its being interconnected by networks.
If power has difficulties in integrating the liquid, free-floating, and dispersed practices of
discipline or control into its library of ‘databases’ — which constitute a vast network of stored
information about the daily activities of the populace (Poster, 1990: 69–98) — power’s
regulatory mechanisms are likely to be incomplete. It is only possible to implement the current
mechanisms of capitalist power by situating them within the electronic network structure. Raely
(2004) points out that the current power system has ‘energy, movement, and dynamism’ (120),
which make up ‘modulating networks of command’ (125). Raely’s concept of ‘modulating
networks of command’ is quite useful for analyzing the new practices of modern global power.
Raely expresses the modulating system of power as a ‘loose assemblage of relations
characterized by […] flexibility, functionality, mobility, programmability, and automation’ (132).
The technology permitting such an assemblage is the electronic network, which ‘abstracts human
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bodies from their territorial settings and separates them into a series of discrete flows’ (Haggerty
and Ericson, 2000: 605). The loose but integrated communication network is an ‘instrumental
facilitator’ of power (Raely, 2004: 135). The new mechanism of power ‘need not necessarily
operate through domination, subjection, and imposition, because it now operates through
insinuation, which is a modal switch of power and consists of hosts accepting rather than
rejecting or being forced to accept’ (135). When the spatial conduit of electronic
communications becomes the material infrastructure of contemporary power, modulation and
assemblage become the technical standards of common ‘protocols’ or ‘codes’ that link up the
free-floating data of individuals, groups, and classes (Galloway, 2001).
In the global system of Empire, it is obvious that new complex hierarchies are
reconfigured along with the metropolitan and global cities as command centres and nodal points,
‘technopoles’ as R&D centres, and the worldwide telecommunication infrastructures as the
conduit of capital and information. ‘A new geography of centrality and marginality’ (Sassen,
2005) is being drawn not so much by national boundaries or cultural proximity as by these
virtual networks. The unequal mechanisms among localities depend on whether they have
plugged into, switched on, and connected themselves to the transnational networks of Empire.
Summary
This study has briefly surveyed the genealogy of globalisation theories, focusing especially on
Marxist interpretations of capital accumulation on a global scale. In the first age of imperialism,
critical scholars investigated the absorption of surplus by colonialist expansion to non-capitalist
states, and, next, by the export of capital to underdeveloped countries. In the second stage of
globalisation studies, scholars considered the ‘underdevelopment’ or ‘dependent development’ of
the Third World, especially Latin America, with a dualistic structure of centre–periphery and
North–South. These dependency theories and world system analyses of globalisation supposed a
rigid hierarchical structure of the globalising force over the local. Scholars’ recognition of
hybridity and complexity in globalisation has led some to view the flexible and multiple status of
the local as relatively free from the dominion of global capital. Other scholars, however, have
argued that these hybrid and complex traits should be regarded as the sign of global capital’s
ability to absorb such local differences. This argument is mostly dependent on seeing the global–
local nexus as an intricate web structure.
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Globalisation as Empire upgrades these global–local debates with the concept of a global
society of control. It shows how the current digitised patterns of a globalising force that the
electronic networks make possible are able to absorb the differences and complexities across the
world through ‘modulating networks of command’ and ‘insinuation’. Thus, Empire no longer
designates the Pax Americana or the ‘Triad’ of economic powers, but rather the interconnected
web of the world market. The worldwide web structure becomes ‘mobile power’, the
overarching regulatory control of global capital. The new ‘hypermobile’ power is able to ‘lay an
abstract space over concrete territorial configurations’ (Morley and Robins, 1995: 75) and
construct a global space of control through weaving hyperspace. The present study takes this
theoretical approach, but will, in addition, consider the active role of the state as agent of local
and global capital.
Under this new condition of virtual geography, it is natural that South Korea’s
government and business sector are urgently struggling to incorporate the country into the
electronic mode of Empire so that it can achieve a ‘functional’ position as one nodal point of
Empire’s global networks. In the Second World War, during the Japanese occupation of Korea,
Japanese military imperialism forced Koreans to build a national road and railway network
across the Korean Peninsula to make it accessible to the vast markets of China; the current
Empire’s project, however, will not need the violence of physical mobilization to subordinate the
local under its global order: to obtain membership in the global society, Korea now must
voluntarily build information infrastructures across the entire country and plug itself into the
Empire’s electronic networks. Survival in the age of Empire depends on local abilities to
function as a part of the imperial web structure.
The Virtual Geography of the IT Infrastructure in Korea
The present study examines South Korea’s historical and geographical processes of installing the
information and communication infrastructures throughout the country with the twofold goal of
enlisting South Korea as an Asian hub of global Empire and of normalising control by
technological artefacts. This study sees the major shifts in the practices of power arising
concurrently with the major shifts of the political system in Korea — from the military
dictatorships (1963–1992) to the civilian governments (1993–present) 3.
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Table 1. The Major Shifts in the Practices of Korean Government’s Power

Major drive
Secondary drive
Main
infrastructures

Authoritarian governments
(1963–1992)
Disciplinary control
Industrial development
Highways, subways, computerisation of
residential ID numbers

Civilian governments
(1993–present)
Neoliberal marketism
Normalising control
Korea eXpress train (300km/h), Internet
backbone, mobile and satellite networks

Table 1 shows that state interventionism in South Korea has moved in two main directions, that
of political regulation and that of economic expansion. While the military regimes began to
introduce the computerisation of administrative affairs for the purpose of disciplinary control of
the citizen, the civilian governments have rapidly built the Internet backbone and wireless
networks to adapt themselves to the global trend of neoliberalism4. During both periods, a
common goal has been the ‘war of speed’ aiming at both control and growth. This local dynamic
was not so much decided by a simple affiliation into the global Empire as by complex processes
of domestic control and economic development through the mass mobilisation of the citizens
toward informatisation. In Korea, the major drive of informatisation has been not only the state’s
desire to support domestic conglomerates (the Korean form of crony capitalism), but also its
desire to regulate the citizens by the normalising control of network technology. It is interesting
to see how the legacies of control constructed by the military regimes became the material
grounds of the electronic backbone networks that are furthering the current capitalist
accumulation in Korea. Korea’s function as a part of the electronic Empire thus comes from the
desire for social control no less than from the economic motive to plug into the global network.
The next two sections of this paper will investigate in detail the historical and geographical
development of communication infrastructures that has conditioned the globalising dynamic of
Korea.
Computerisation and Informatisation as the Technique of Governmentality
Foucault ([1979] 1991) describes ‘governmentality’ as the art of exercising power on things, in
other words, the scientific management of population and the constitution of political economy.
He views the power shift in eighteenth-century Europe as one ‘from a regime dominated by
structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government’ (101). This concept
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illuminates how Korea’s power systems have developed the regulatory mechanism of a science
of knowledge (savoir). Foucault’s concept of governmentality presents a vision of the exercise of
rule as far more than simply its direct discipline or violence. The management of population or
statistics is weighted more on the side of shaping the ‘general’ conditions of the population than
of the direct management of its individual bodies.
In Korea, the first computerisation policy was directed primarily at gathering and storing
information about citizens so it would be immediately available to both the national and the local
authorities; this was the new technique of governmentality under the military regime. This
project of regulating the whole of the citizenry was established under Cheong-Hee Park’s
presidency (1963–1979). In 1968, Park, the first dictator who came to power by military coup,
introduced a notorious registration system for the whole populace. This ID system evolved to
facilitate the government’s control by means of computer databases, as mandated by Park’s order
of administrative computerisation in January 1975 (NCA, 2005a). The government’s electronic
databases accumulated a great deal of personal information, collecting over 140 different pieces
of profiling information for each individual.
While governmental computerisation was implemented primarily due to a desire for
control over the citizens, Park was also ambitious to promote the national economy, especially
by constructing national highway and railway infrastructures, such as the Kyong–In highway line
linking Seoul and Incheon, a satellite city, in 1968, the Kyong–Bu highway line between Seoul
and Busan in 1970, and the first railway line transporting commuters from Seoul to Incheon in
1971. The highway and railway infrastructures were closely tied to the government’s project of
economic modernisation, to save on the costs of transporting goods and services, and to speed up
the mobility of the labour population. The rapid construction of national roads and railways
under the military regime was a typical case of state interventionism aimed at promoting
industrial economies that were lagging behind. The geographical biases of such development,
which was aimed linking only large metropolitan areas, have caused serious social issues such as
a high concentration of the population in a few cities, regional inequalities, environmental
destruction, and so forth.
From 1987 on, the policy focus of computerisation moved towards informatisation,
focusing on building a national Internet backbone network to achieve technological
rationalisation in such areas as employment, economic statistics, transportation, education, and
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banking, as well as on the electronic management of residential IDs (NCA, 2005a). Electronic
networks became appealing to the government, not merely as a conduit of control, but also
because of the economic possibilities available if domestic capital was able to efficiently plug
into the global networks of Empire.
Becoming a Nodal Point of Electronic Empire
State interventionism under the military regimes — chiefly by violent labour control and a vast
amount of investment in transportation infrastructure — brought about a remarkable growth of
the Korean economy. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea has not fit the concept of
‘underdevelopment’ as seen in much of in Latin America. Paul Wolfowitz, the current World
Bank president, recently visited Seoul and praised Korea as the ‘world IT leader’, and the
Korean informatisation index has jumped into the first tier of information wealth within a short
time span (NCA, 2005b). Despite the financial crisis of 1997, the main drive for unrestrained
economic growth has been to mobilise the citizens towards high-speed IT mobility and connexity
throughout the country (e.g. Kim, 2006; Jin, 2005): for instance, with heavy involvement from
France’s Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), Alstom, and the French transportation engineering firm
Systra, in 2004 a high-speed eXpress railway line from Seoul to Busan was built at a total cost of
$16.3 billion. Its transport speed of 300 kilometres per hour amounts to a speed more than one
hundred times faster than that of the first railway in Korea5. The construction of a high-speed
railway is changing our perception of physical distances markedly.
In the digital sphere, the national desire for electronic mobility was first expressed in the
1995 Framework Act on Informatisation Promotion (FAIP, Act No. 4969). The Korean
government’s basic information policy has been oriented toward setting up economic
‘efficiencies’ in the national and global market. The Act has been used to provide economic
momentum to allow the bigger IT businesses to increase their market share with the formal
support of the Korean government, primarily through building the backbone of a national highspeed Internet network. The FAIP thus meant that the government would directly intervene at the
policy level in the nascent market of IT industries and force them to restructure themselves
toward IT competitiveness in both the local and the global knowledge market. The ostensible
purpose of the FAIP is to allow Korea to take its place as a functional part of global Empire and
to contribute to the development of the national economy, thereby promoting informatisation and
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achieving an advanced information and communications industry infrastructure; this was
concretised in the government’s project for building ‘the high-speed IT Infrastructure’
implemented between 1995 and 2005 (NCA, 2005a). The Korean government’s information
backbone network project was originally motivated by the US ‘Information Superhighway’
project in 1993, which was further developed by Japan’s ‘Pilot model’ and the EU’s ‘EuroISDN’ in 1994. In order to establish a US-style nationwide information superhighway network,
the Korean government invested public funds of about $450 billion over eleven years. The
Korean government currently celebrates the synergistic effects of the national information
superhighway network — chiefly, the bureaucratic efficiencies brought about by the
technological rationalisation of interconnecting the public institutions electronically and the
growth of the IT-related new economic market.
The business-oriented goal of FAIP and the national project of IT infrastructure were
further developed in the second policy plan, ‘Cyber Korea 21’ (CK21), issued in March 1999.
According to CK21, the quality of life in Korea would be improved by the rapidly increasing
opportunities derived from connecting to the commercial broadband Internet made possible by
the implementation of major electronic networks for e-commerce. The market-initiative has
culminated in the most recent version of the government’s IT policy, ‘E-Korea Vision 2006’
(EKV06). In the Informatisation White Paper 2003 (NCA, 2003), EKV06 states that its goal is
both to promote the ‘information society’ at the national level and to gain ‘strong ties of
international cooperation toward the global information society’ (10).

Table 2. Domestic/International Connexity of Major Commercial Networks
Network (company)
Kornet (KT)
Boranet (Dacom)
Hananet (Hanaro Telecom)

Domestic connexity (IX plus ISPs)
235.5G (70.5G + 165G)
168G (70.5G + 97.6G)
153G (123.5G + 29G)

Other major five networks
151.3G (79.3G + 72G)
(Onse Telecom, Thrunet,
Enterprise Network,
Dreamline, Samsung
Network)
* Source (NCA, 2005b: 72–74)

(Unit: bps)
International connexity
28.5G (US: 21.2G, Asia: 7.3G)
12G (US: 7G, Asia: 5G)
7.7G (US: 4.96G, Asia: 1.15G,
others: 1.7G)
1.35G
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Due to these strong national and global policy drives, in mobile communication, Korea
currently supports the technological standards of both the code division multiple access (CDMA)
and wideband CDMA (WCDMA) mobile communication networks. The ranges of data
transmission are from 9.6Kbps to 2.4Mbps in the CDMA, and up to 2Mbps in the WCDMA
(NCA, 2005b: 80). The number of mobile phone users in Korea is rapidly growing — as of
January 2005, there were over 36.5 million registered users out of a population of 48 million —
and the high-speed data service of mobile phones utilises the seamless wireless communications
throughout the country. As of September 2005, the Internet backbone network enables the
transmitting of digital data at a rate ranging from 2.5 to 10 gigabytes per second (Gbps). As the
national public backbone nodes, the Korea Internet eXchange (KIX) of Seoul and Busan’s
Internet eXchange (BIX) provide connection bandwidth capacities of 51.3Gbps and 8.6Gbps,
respectively (NCA, 2006: 101).
Table 2 shows both the domestic bandwidth of Internet connection of some major
commercial companies and their international connexity (a total of 50Gbps) to the global
electronic network. In addition to the connection of domestic commercial networks to the
electronic Empire, non-commercial backbone Internet networks used by educational institutions
and intelligence agencies also provide an international link of 775 megabytes per second (Mbps)
via KIX to the US (NCA, 2005b: 75), and the Korea Advanced Research Network for
international R&D collaboration has international links to Japan (1Gbps), China (310Mbps), the
US (1Gbps), and Europe (155Mbps). Moreover, 11 submarine optical cable lines for
international data transmission have been installed in the cities of Taean, Keoje, and Busan, with
a total capacity of up to 19 terabytes per second (Tbps) (NCA, 2005b: 78). The number of
satellite communication facilities has also greatly increased: 40 satellite antennas across seven
regions now cover overseas phone, broadcasting, data transmission, and Internet services with
high-speed connections to international satellites such as Intelsat, Asiasat, Panamsat, and Telstar
(NCA, 2005b: 79).
Since the mid-1990s, the Korean government’s desire for strong ties to electronic Empire
has resulted in subordinating its information policies entirely under supranational economic
institutions that represent the global economic order of intellectual property regimes. Law and
policy around intellectual property (IP) has been entirely subordinated to international
agreements and the interests of domestic IP holders: South Korea became a party to the World
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Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) in 1995, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1996,
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty in 2004. The rapid
enlistment of Korea into the new ‘global quasi-government’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 175) and
into the electronic network of Empire signifies that Korea is taking an active part in the new
knowledge-based economic order of globalisation. Within the global geography of the electronic
Empire, Korea’s functional role is as a nodal point of East Asia both for disseminating the ideas
of the quasi-governmental nerve centres and for switching the local networks into the global
electronic impulse.
In sum, the modern historical-geographical development of the national IT infrastructures
in South Korea has been a vigorous struggle to improve the mobility and connexity of capital;
this can be seen in the industrial railways, the highways and subways, the high-speed railways,
and the high-speed broadband Internet and mobile communication networks. Although Korea’s
informatisation policies under civilian governments have been driven largely by neoliberal
economic imperatives, the desire to control the citizenry has never disappeared from the time of
the authoritarian governments onward. Due to the advanced network infrastructure, the invention
of positive technologies for free-floating control has become the most significant of all, because
it can hide under an ethical patina the real intention of control directed at establishing the new
digital rule of cybersociety. Moreover, the state never forgets its role as ally of the national and
multinational Chaebols — the large family-owned Korean conglomerates such as Samsung and
LG in mobile electronics — and of the telecommunication duopolies Korea Telecom and Dacom
in IT infrastructure projects.
Conclusion
The ‘challenge of Asian IT activity’, including Korea, can be seen as one example of the
complexity and hybridity of the local in relation to the global prospects of electronic Empire
(Boyd-Barrett, 2006). In fact, through its computer-networking infrastructure, South Korea is
transforming itself into the first tier of next-generation IT businesses. The government has even
launched the slogan ‘U(biquitous)-Korea’, which is intended to encourage the integration of all
communication systems and electronic devices; the government hopes thereby to promote the
image of South Korea as one of the world’s most developed Internet and wireless nations.
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From the vantage point of electronic Empire, the ‘Asian challenge’ is no longer a direct
economic threat to Empire; rather Asia assumes functions within the worldwide network, part of
which consists of Asian nodal points such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Seoul, and Beijing. These
Asian nodal points for Empire also reproduce the uneven development of geographies within
each national boundary. As shown in Korea’s geographical history of transportation and
information infrastructures, these nodal points are largely centred in a few major metropolitan
cities, while other cities and regions are relatively alienated from the societal benefits of
networking. The IT successes in Asia have emerged from a harsh remodelling of inclusion and
exclusion among locales, cities, regions, and provinces, coerced by the interventionist hand of
the state.
Hardt and Negri’s thesis of Empire has advanced the discussion of globalisation through
their hypothesis that in a global rule the material condition of ‘the survival of the fittest’ has been
transformed from the fixed structure of development and underdevelopment into the issue of
connexity to the network of Empire; however, this thesis overlooks many of the complex layers
through which the political entities of local states integrate with a globalising force. While the
globalising force of capital has become more and more dominant, it connotes ‘a global system of
multiple local states, structured in a complex relation of dominion and subordination’ (Wood,
2003: 20). Hardt and Negri’s perspective does supply some answers as to how to situate the
remarkable Asian IT growth within electronic Empire; however, its local mechanisms need to be
specified by concretely examining the cooperative relationship between local Asian states and
capital accumulation.
What is needed is a model specific to Asian IT economies in globalisation that describes
the ‘tendency toward deformation’ of IT growth under conditions of extreme state intervention, a
deformation which includes such phenomena as the increase of inequalities between major
metropolitan centres and other areas of the same country, environmental destruction, harsh
labour control, and crony capitalism. Under the universal dominion of electronic Empire, the
survival of states depends increasingly on their mobility and connexity to the world market. This
study has given an overview of Korea’s international electronic data links by means of satellite,
submarine fibre-optic lines, backbone Internet networks, and R&D networks. Superficially, the
story of the IT struggle in Korea is the story of its successful incorporation into the imperial
network; the less public side of the story is much darker.
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It is a story of pervasive interventionism by an authoritarian state and its ‘marketfriendly’ IT policies, in the form of weighting all the advantages toward the Korean type of
crony capitalism, a close symbiosis between bureaucratic state systems and the Chaebols, or
dynastic, family-owned conglomerates. The Korean government’s Chaebol-driven growth
policies enabled domestic conglomerates such as Samsung and LG to suppress workers’ attempts
to organize and unionize. The Chaebols’ brand images as the high-tech global leaders, therefore,
spring not only from their own successful business strategies and goals but also from their
special mode of capital accumulation aided by state interventionism, that is to say, from a
structural symbiosis between the anti-labour business climate in Chaebols and the state’s
regulatory labour control. Additionally, the prerequisites for the connection of Korea to the
global electronic Empire were the dissemination of the ideology of technological development to
the citizenry and the accumulation of capital through harsh labour control locally through the
collaboration between businesses and the state. Another significant fact is that the national IT
infrastructure originated historically from the state’s administrative computerisation for
regulative control, and only later was its function transformed to serve the commercial purposes
of IT businesses.
These distorted and deformed embryological origins inscribed in Asian IT growth are
often ignored as trivial affairs, while the rapid and visible growth index of IT businesses are
praised indiscriminately. Behind its public image as a global IT leader, however, the other,
darker side of Korea’s informatisation is composed of the complex and hybrid traits of the local,
posited under the material condition of global capitalism’s new electronic Empire.
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Notes
1. The present study investigates mainly the worldwide electronic network as a conduit of capital. The other
significant momentum of capital accumulation in the digital age — the privatizing mechanisms of ‘immaterial’ or
intellectual labour in a global scale — are beyond the scope of the present study. It now clear, however, that the
expropriation and privatization of the common cultural assets of humankind have become the ultimate goals of
contemporary capitalism, which also accompanies the construction of a new virtual geography of electronic
connexity and mobility. For instance, Hardt and Negri (2004) describe the expropriation of value in the age of
digital capitalism as ‘the capture of value’ that is produced by cooperative labour and that must be protected by
powerful intellectual property laws.
2. Similar to the pan-Spanish ‘Telenovela’ culture, which is relatively independent from the monolithic cultural
dominance of the Hollywood production system, Korea’s cultural products — notably, its blockbuster movies,
television programs, fashion, and popular music — have become favorites among Asians and even among Latin
Americans. The so-called ‘Korean Wave’ (or Halryu) refers to the growing appeal of Korean popular culture in
other Asian countries, and is often theoretically explained by ‘cultural proximity,’ a phenomenon first identified
by empirical studies of the TV-watching patterns of Latin Americans.
3. In another article, I examine in detail how the techniques of power were gradually transformed from a centralized
and hierarchical model into a distributive and dispersed network model (Lee, 2007). I explore how, at the
institutional level, during the period of repressive and disciplinary society in Korea (1948–1992), the regulatory
control systems of the state were mainly performed by two formidable apparatuses: the national ID system and the
National Security Law. On the other hand, the deployment of institutional power since 1993 has been based on the
logic of free-floating control, dispersion, normalization, and modulation of digital databases.
4. By definition, neoliberalism arises from a pervasive global force to entirely reconfigure society by national and
international business powers, going beyond the classical claims of the laissez-faire market operated by the
‘invisible hand’. To optimize conditions for capital accumulation within a nation, a market-friendly public policy
is essential in neoliberalism, which consequently causes cut-backs in welfare provision, health care, public
education, core social services, and at the same time market incentives in the form of tax breaks, the provision of
infrastructure at state expense, and the opening of local markets known as ‘structural adjustment’ to global forces
(Harvey, 2006: 23–26).
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5. See the following site describing South Korea’s high-speed railway, http://www.railwaytechnology.com/projects/koreatgv/
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